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The Role of Perception in
Demonstrative Reference
Susanna Siegel
1. Introduction
Suppose you are looking for your keys.  You check your
pocket, then a table by the door, and you finally notice them
sitting next to a pile of mail. "These are my keys," you say.
Clearly the word "these" refers to your keys.  But on what
does this fact supervene?  Which conditions are such that,
necessarily, if they obtain, then your use of 'these' has the
referent it does?
An informative answer to this question would include
mention of two different sorts of facts.  First, it would in-
clude the fact that you were speaking in English, and that in
English, 'these' does not pick out anything independently of
a particular occasion of use.  Second, it would include facts
about which features of that occasion give your use of the
demonstrative its reference.  It is controversial just which
features these are, but some candidates are the following:
your referential intentions, gestures of pointing, facts about
conversational salience, or some combination of the above.
In this paper, I take for granted the facts about when a
speaker is speaking in English and that in English, 'these',
'that' and 'this' are context-dependent expressions.  (And I
take for granted the analogous facts about other languages
and their speakers.)  Taking these things for granted, I offer
an account of which features of the context fix demonstrative
reference.
On my account, the speaker's perceptual states are crucial
to demonstrative reference-fixing.  In the most basic uses of
demonstratives, I argue, the speaker perceives what she
demonstratively refers to, and the reference of her use of a
demonstrative is fixed by a perceptually anchored referential
intention.  Along with intentionists about demonstrative ref-
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erence, then, I hold that speaker intentions of some variety
fix demonstrative reference.  Unlike traditional intentionism,
however, my version is limited to a certain class of uses of
demonstratives.  I argue that in these uses, the speaker's ref-
erential intentions fix demonstrative reference, and that in
the formation of these intentions, perceptual states play a
crucial role.  To distinguish my view from other views which
give speaker intentions a special role in demonstrative refer-
ence-fixing, I call my view "Limited Intentionism."
A word about terminology.  I will speak throughout of
uses of demonstratives as referring.  What a use of a demon-
strative refers to is conceptually distinct from what a speaker
refers to by the use of a demonstrative on a particular occa-
sion.  It is a conceptual possibility with demonstratives, as
with other expressions, that a speaker may be mistaken
about what the semantic reference of her use of a demon-
strative is.
1, 
2
1Nothing I say in speaking of uses of demonstratives as referring commits
me to one side or the other in the debate about whether it is expressions-in-
contexts or events of utterance in which expressions are used that are the bearers
of propositional content.  (Kaplan, in his 1989, pp. 522, 546, argues that the
former notion is required to give a model-theoretic semantics for languages in-
cluding demonstratives.  Israel and Perry [1996] and Garcia-Carpintero [1998]
argue for a use-based approach.)
2According to some ways of drawing the semantics/pragmatics distinction,
uses of demonstratives have no semantic reference at all.  On one such view of
the distinction, semantic interpretations of utterances result from the conven-
tional meanings of linguistic expressions, rules of composition, and the values of
uses of automatic indexicals (this terminology is from J. Perry 1997).  Auto-
matic indexicals include 'I', 'today', and 'tomorrow'.  They do not require extra
supplement from the context, in contrast with both bare demonstratives (which
are at issue in this paper), and complex demonstratives (which are not at issue in
this paper).  Interpretations of utterances are pragmatic, according to this view,
if they result from the sort of contextual supplementation that speaker intentions
are suited to provide.  A proponent of this construal of the semantics/pragmatics
distinction is Kent Bach, who allows that uses of the first-person pronoun have
semantic reference, but denies that uses of demonstratives (both bare and com-
To say what motivates Limited Intentionism, we must
consider the class of uses of demonstratives to which this ac-
count is limited.  Call a Basic Case of demonstrative reference a
case which meets the following three conditions.  Where S is
a speaker who uses a demonstrative expression D, and suc-
ceeds in referring, by her use of D, to an object x:
(a) S perceives x;
(b) S intends to refer to x by using D;
(c) The intention described in (b) is anchored by
S's perception of x.
The claim that an occurrence of demonstrative reference
is a Basic Case leaves open whether speaker intentions help
fix demonstrative reference.  A Basic Case of demonstrative
reference is, by definition, a case in which the speaker has a
certain kind of referential intention—namely, a perceptually
anchored one.  But it is not by definition a case in which the
use of a demonstrative refers to what it does because  the
speaker has this intention.  I will argue later that this is in
                                                                                                                    
plex) do.  (See his 1987, ch. 9.  Bach's is not the only construal of the seman-
tics/pragmatics distinction that prohibits uses of demonstratives from having
semantic reference; another view of the distinction that prohibits this is dis-
cussed in J. Stanley and J. King MS.)
In this paper, I will assume that there is no principled distinction between
automatic indexicals and bare demonstratives that makes uses of the former but
not the latter have semantic values.
One further warning.  Once views of the semantics/pragmatics distinction of
the sort just mentioned are set aside, there is no special reason to doubt that
speaker intentions of a certain kind can have semantic significance.  The fact
that speaker-reference—which is undoubtedly a creature of pragmatics on any
way of drawing the distinction with semantics—is determined by speaker inten-
tions should not be confused with the claim that any reference relation deter-
mined by speaker intentions is thereby something other than semantic reference.3
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fact so; but it is not part of the definition of Basic Cases that
it is so.
3
Two clarifications are in order about the intention that
figures in Basic Cases.
First, having a perceptually anchored intention does not
preclude having addressee-directed intentions as well.  In-
deed, normally, speakers will have such intentions as
well—for instance, speakers will intend that their addressee
take an object o to be what the speaker is referring to.
Second, the notion of semantic reference does not figure
in the content of the perceptually anchored intention.
Rather, the intention in question is an intention to refer to an
object o by using a demonstrative. Whether an object o ends
up being the semantic referent of the use of the demonstra-
tive is what is at issue between Limited Intentionism and its
opponents.  Limited Intentionism predicts that if a speaker
uses a demonstrative and conditions (a)–(c) are met, then the
speaker's use of the demonstrative refers to the object of her
perceptually anchored intention.
 The idea that a referential intention can be "anchored by"
perception needs explaining.  We can illustrate the idea with
an example:
Example 1.  You see a single set of keys in front
of you, which you take to be yours.  You say,
"These are mine," intending to refer, by your
use of 'these', to the keys you see in front of
you.
Contrast this example with another:
3We can safely ignore the distinction between the notion that referential in-
tention is a necessary and sufficient condition for demonstrative reference, on
the one hand; and the notion that demonstrative  reference to x occurs because of
the speaker's referential intention, on the other.
Example 2.  You are looking straight at your
keys, but you don't recognize them.  Not only
do you not recognize the keys you see; you be-
lieve that your keys are behind you.  You point
behind you, saying "These are my keys," and
intending by the use of 'these' to refer to your
keys.
In Example 2, your referential intention is not anchored by a
perception of your keys.  You do perceive your keys. And
you intend to refer to your keys.  But your referential inten-
tion is not anchored by your perception of what you intend
to refer to.  This is the intuitive distinction that underlies the
idea that referential intentions can be anchored by percep-
tion.  There is a clear sense in which in Example 1, but not in
Example 2, it is in virtue of your perceiving your keys that
you are in a position to refer to them.  In Example 2, you are
in a position to refer to your keys, but not in virtue of per-
ceiving them right then (nor even, perhaps, in virtue of per-
ceiving them at some time in the past).
The contrast between these two examples illustrates per-
ceptual anchoring.  The illustration is just that: an illustra-
tion.  It does not specify the role of perception in the an-
choring of referential intentions, let alone explain how such
anchoring occurs.  These are substantial questions for the
philosophy of perception, worthy of separate discussion;
they will not be pursued here.
Limited Intentionism is an account of what establishes
demonstrative reference that is limited to Basic Cases.  What
motivates giving an account that is limited in this way?
2. Motivation
Limited Intentionism is motivated by two ideas: first, that
perception is a means for anchoring uses of demonstratives4
Susanna Siegel Perception in Demonstrative Reference
to things; second, that the notion of "having something in
mind" is underdefined.
Let me begin with the first idea: that perception can an-
chor uses of demonstratives to the things those uses refer to.
We perceive facts about our surroundings by perceiving
things; we can state facts about our surroundings by demon-
stratively referring to things.  Perception can anchor uses of
demonstratives to, say, a baby when it represents contrasts
between the baby and its surroundings.
Sometimes, without perceiving any such contrast, one
perceives the area where a thing is in plain view.  Suppose,
for instance, that S looks at a chameleon whose surfaces look
exactly like those surrounding it.  It is a matter of contro-
versy whether in such a case S sees the chameleon or merely
sees its surfaces.
4  Even if S does see the chameleon, how-
ever, S's seeing it does not suffice to make it available to S as
an object of demonstrative reference.  In contrast, when one's
perception of a thing does allow one to differentiate it from
its surroundings, one can go on to refer to it demonstra-
tively.  This makes it plausible to suppose that it is a certain
kind of perception—namely, perceptual differentiation of a
thing from its surroundings—that makes demonstrative ref-
erence in those cases possible.
Going along with its suitability for securing demonstra-
4It is controversial whether representing contrasts between an object o and
its surroundings  is a necessary condition for perceiving o. According to Fred
Dretske (1969), visually differentiating o from its surroundings is necessary in
order to see o.  (Dretske makes an exception for portions of surfaces: one can
see a portion of a wall of uniform color and texture, he says, even if nothing
about that portion is distinctive.)  Limited Intentionism is motivated by a weaker
and far less controversial claim than Dretske's.  What motivates Limited Inten-
tionism is the idea that visual differentiation sometimes accompanies seeing.
This claim is neutral on the question of whether there are kinds of seeing that
don't involve visual differentiation (e.g., whether one sees the chameleon or
merely sees its surfaces).
tive reference, perception is also a means for making true a
presupposition by the speaker that seems to be a necessary
condition on the felicity (appropriateness)
5 of an assertive
demonstrative utterance.  It seems to be a necessary condi-
tion on the felicity of an assertive demonstrative utterance
that the speaker presuppose that there is a distinct object (or
area, or part of an object, or property) to which she is
demonstratively referring.  If a speaker felicitously uses a
demonstrative and her use refers, then she has already, to
some extent, differentiated it in thought.  Consider an utter-
ance in which the speaker does not differentiate any object in
thought yet purports to refer by the use of a demonstrative.
A blindfolded speaker, unsure of his exact surroundings,
points and says "That is a man."  Even if there were someone
pointed to, the utterance would be infelicitous, since it is in-
appropriate to make an assertion without believing that it is
(or is likely to be) true.
6  This suggests that such utterances
are felicitous only if the speaker presupposes that there is a
distinct object (or area, etc.) to which her use of the demon-
strative refers.  The most straightforward way to make such
presuppositions true is to succeed in differentiating an object
(area, etc) in thought.  Perception is a means of doing that.
To be sure, such presuppositions are not always true.
They are false when uses of demonstratives fail to refer be-
cause there is nothing there to refer to, as when the speaker
is hallucinating.  The motivation for Limited Intentionism is
not the idea that perception is sufficient for establishing de-
monstrative reference, or even for anchoring thought to
things.  The motivation is rather that perception is a natural
candidate for making felicitous uses of demonstratives that
5Felicity is a pre-theoretical notion of appropriateness of utterance.  In many
(perhaps most) conversational contexts, Gricean maxims are the standard of ap-
propriateness.
6Such an utterance violates a Gricean maxim of quality: do not say that for
which you lack adequate evidence.  See Grice 1975, p. 152.5
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latch on to the things they refer to.  It is prima facie plausible
to think that the speaker's perceiving the referent of a use of
a demonstrative plays a central role in making such uses re-
fer as they do.
 Besides the idea that perception can anchor demonstra-
tive reference, Limited Intentionism has a second motiva-
tion: it makes the notion of having something in mind more
specific.  That this notion needs to be made more specific is
evident from the debate about traditional intentionism—the
view that in all cases demonstrative reference is fixed by the
speaker's referential intentions.
A standard objection to traditional intentionism is that a
speaker's use of a demonstrative can refer to something the
speaker does not have in mind.  This standard objection
comes in two versions.  The first version concerns Basic
Cases of demonstrative reference; the second concerns non-
Basic Cases.  According to the first version, even in Basic
Cases a demonstrative sometimes refers to an object that the
speaker does not have in mind, so the facts about which ob-
ject a speaker has in mind do not determine the facts about
reference-fixing.  The second version of the standard objec-
tion draws the same conclusion with respect to non-
perceptually-anchored uses of demonstratives.  From the
claim that these uses sometimes refer to an object that the
speaker does not have in mind, it concludes that perception
does not fix demonstrative reference.
It is important to distinguish between these two versions
of the standard objection.  Only the version directed at Basic
Cases threatens to refute Limited Intentionism.  The type of
example standardly taken to illustrate the irrelevance of
speaker intentions to the facts about reference-fixing in Basic
Cases, I argue, does not show the irrelevance of speaker in-
tentions at all.  Rather, it illustrates the possibility of having
conflicting intentions to refer.  Cases of speakers with con-
flicting referential intentions are not, as critics claim, coun-
terexamples to intentionism.  Instead, examples of conflict-
ing referential intentions merely pose a challenge to inten-
tionists.  These cases challenge intentionists to specify the
content of the reference-fixing intentions, and thereby give a
basis for predicting which referential intention fixes refer-
ence.  The ordinary notion of having an object in mind is
underdefined, and so a viable version of intentionism must
appeal to a more specific notion.  Indeed, since both sides of
the debate about traditional intentionism make use of the
underdefined notion of having something in mind, the de-
bate as a whole cannot progress until this notion is made
more specific.  To the extent that Limited Intentionism offers
a more specific notion of having something in mind, it
moves the debate forward.
As for the version of the objection directed at non-Basic
Cases, by contrast, the fan of Limited Intentionism is free to
grant it.  If Limited Intentionism is true, its truth does not
necessarily shed light on what fixes demonstrative reference
in non-Basic Cases.  This is not an unfortunate limitation, but
rather a virtue given the need to make the notion of having
in mind more specific.
The rest of this paper will go as follows.  In Section 3, I
examine the first version of the standard objection to inten-
tionism (I call this the perceptual version).  In Section 4, I show
how Limited Intentionism meets the challenge that this ver-
sion of the objection poses.  In Section 5, I justify giving an
account of demonstrative reference-fixing that is limited to
the Basic Cases.  Finally, in Section 6, I defend Limited In-
tentionism against an alleged counterexample.
3. The Standard Objection to Intentionism:
The Perceptual Version
The standard objection to intentionism is that there are cases
in which a speaker demonstratively refers to something that
she does not have in mind or intend to refer to, and thus6
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speaker intentions do not fix demonstrative reference.  In the
perceptual version of this objection, the actual referent of the
speaker's use of a demonstrative is something the speaker
perceives.
Reimer and Wettstein both raise the standard objection to
intentionism in its perceptual version.  In each case, a
speaker confuses the referent of her use of a demonstrative
with another thing.  I will argue that the speakers Reimer
and Wettstein discuss have conflicting referential intentions,
and that if intentionism has any hope of responding to the
perceptual version of the standard objection, it must have a
criterion that determines which of these conflicting inten-
tions fixes reference.
Reimer's objection goes like this.  According to inten-
tionism, when a speaker succeeds in referring by the use of a
demonstrative D, her use of D refers to what she intends to
refer to by using D.
7  But in some cases, what the speaker
intends to refer to is not the referent of her (otherwise suc-
cessful) demonstrative utterance.  So these intentions do not
fix demonstrative reference.
Reimer describes such a case:
Suppose that I suddenly realize that I have left my keys
on the desk in my (shared) office.  I return to my office,
where I find the desk occupied by my officemate.  I then
spot my keys, sitting there on the desk, alongside my of-
ficemate's keys.  I then make a grab for my keys, saying
just as I mistakenly grab my officemate's keys, "These are
mine." [1991, p. 190]
7Reimer (1991) is attacking Kaplan's view in his 1989, according to which
what he calls a "directing intention" fixes reference (p. 582).  This view differs
from the one Kaplan held in his 1978, according to which intentions do not fix
reference.  A directing intention to refer to something is an intention to refer to a
thing on which one has focused one's attention.  Kaplan, however, does not re-
strict the notion of directing intentions to those that are anchored by a perceptual
link to the thing to which one intends to refer.
As Reimer describes the case, the speaker does not lack eye-
hand coordination.  She is not looking at her own keys while
grabbing her officemate's; rather, she first sees her keys and
then, without continuing to look at them, grabs the wrong
set.
8  As Reimer construes it, the intentionist view predicts
that the referent of "these" is the speaker's keys, since she
intends to refer to them.  But, she claims, the reference of
"these" is clearly the set of keys that she grabs.  And I think
we should agree: the speaker refers to the keys she grabs.
For, as Reimer says, it is appropriate for the officemate to re-
ply, "No, you're wrong.  Those are not your keys; they're
mine."  This reply would be both false and inappropriate if
the speaker was originally referring to her own keys.
Reimer concludes, however, that what fixes the reference
of the speaker's use of 'these' is her gesture of grabbing.  She
assumes that the sole candidate reference-fixers are these
two: (1) the speaker's intention to refer to the keys which are
hers, and which she rightly took to be hers when she saw
them on the desk; and (2) the gesture of grabbing keys that
are not hers.  But Reimer overlooks a third type of candidate
reference-fixer, which is also an intention: perceptually an-
chored intentions.  In particular, Reimer overlooks a refer-
ential intention anchored by tactile experience.  At the time
of utterance, the referent of "these" is perceptually present to
the speaker.  She has a tactile experience of keys, and she
judges (falsely) that the keys she is holding are the ones she
saw on the desk.  If she can judge that she is holding the
keys on the basis of that tactile experience, then she can also
form an intention to refer to those keys.  And there is clearly
8If the speaker did lack eye-hand coordination—looking at her own keys
while grabbing  her officemate's—then the case would have the same structure
as a type of case discussed later in this section, in which the speaker has two
perceptually anchored referential intentions.  There will be more on such cases
shortly.7
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a sense in which the speaker intends to refer to keys that she
is holding.
Once we consider the tactually anchored intention, we
see that the claim that this intention fixes the reference of the
speaker's use of 'these' makes the right prediction.  In at-
tacking a version of intentionism that does not specify which
referential intention fixes reference, Reimer seems tacitly to
assume that intentionism cannot adjudicate between con-
flicting referential intentions, such as those in the case she
describes.  Conflicting referential intentions would pose a
problem for intentionism only if there were no systematic
account of which intention plays the reference-fixing role.  In
the next section, I will give such an account.  For the mo-
ment, the point is just that Reimer hasn't given a counterex-
ample to intentionism; she has simply posed a challenge, a
challenge to provide a criterion that says which one of a
speaker's various intentions fixes demonstrative reference.
There is a referential intention that could do the job; the
challenge is to give a systematic theory that identifies that
intention as the one that fixes reference.  An adequate de-
fense of intentionism must provide a criterion that the refer-
ence-fixing intention, but no other referential intention, will
meet.
We can draw the same moral from an objection to inten-
tionism raised by Howard Wettstein.  Wettstein modifies a
well-known example from Kripke
9 to criticize the standard
version of intentionism about demonstrative reference:
A speaker wishes to say something about a certain man,
Jones, who he mistakenly thinks he sees off in the dis-
tance.  Jones has recently had open-heart surgery and
the speaker has heard that Jones has foolishly been ex-
9The classic example of conflicting intentions to refer comes from Kripke's
discussion in his 1979, section 3b, of Keith Donellan's distinction between refer-
ential and attributive uses of definite descriptions.
erting himself raking leaves.  He says, pointing to the
man who he takes to be Jones but is actually Smith,
"That is a self-destructive man. He has been raking
against his doctor's orders."  [1984, p. 70]
According to Wettstein, the speaker has Jones in mind but
nevertheless refers to Smith.  So having Jones in mind does
not fix the reference of "that," and thus, Wettstein concludes,
intentionism is false.
Reimer's and Wettstein's problem cases have the same
structure.  Where S is the speaker and D is the demonstra-
tive expression S uses:
(i) There is an object x that appears to S to be at
a certain location L.
(ii) There is a y, y≠x, such that S intends that her
use of D refer to y.
(iii) S believes that y is at L.
To see that each of the problem cases has this structure, con-
sider first Reimer's case: a speaker mistakenly grabs her of-
ficemate's set of keys and says, "These are mine."  In this
case, x is the set of keys the speaker is holding: the keys tac-
tually appear to the speaker to be in her hand.  And y is the
speaker's own set of keys.  S intends her use of 'these' to re-
fer to her keys.  She believes, falsely, that her own keys are
the ones she has in her hand.
In Wettstein's case, x is the man the speaker sees: the man
raking leaves visually appears to the speaker.  And y is
Jones.  The speaker intends his use of 'that' to refer to Jones,
and he falsely believes that the man he sees is Jones.
In both problem cases, the speaker has conflicting inten-
tions to refer.  Both Reimer and Wettstein overlook this fact.
The trouble for intentionism is not, as Reimer's and
Wettstein's descriptions of their cases suggest, that speakers8
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in the problem cases lack intentions to refer to the actual ref-
erent; it is rather that they have too many and conflicting in-
tentions.  Since this is the problem these cases pose, they
challenge intentionism to provide a basis for determining
which of the conflicting intentions to refer fixes reference.  In
the next section, I propose such a criterion, and I show that
this criterion makes the right predictions in cases like Re-
imer's and Wettstein's.
10
4. Limited Intentionism
Limited Intentionism is the following thesis.
LI. If x perceptually appears to S then: S's use of
D refers to x iff S has a perceptually anchored
intention to refer to x by her use of D.
11
10I will be restricting attention to bare demonstratives and ignoring the role
of predicates such as "man wearing a carnation" in fixing the reference of uses
of demonstrative phrases such as "that man wearing a carnation."  Whether such
predicates help fix reference, and if so whether the entire predicate does, are is-
sues that are too complex to discuss here.  Although Limited Intentionism only
applies to bare demonstratives, it does not rule out that the perceptual experience
that anchors referential intentions regarding the use of bare demonstratives rep-
resents sortal properties.
11What if there is more than one object of a certain kind that appears to be at
exactly the same location?  It is controversial whether this can happen; a good
candidate for a case in which it does happen, though, is one in which both a
statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it (but is not identical with it) appear
to a speaker to be at the same location.  In many cases, knowledge common to
the speaker and addressee restricts the kind of thing at the intended location that
is demonstratively referred to.  When no common knowledge does this, and it
does not matter for the truth value of an utterance which thing at the location is
referred to, we have what David Lewis (1993) calls "the problem of the many":
neither semantics nor pragmatics decides which of the many is the referent, but
the utterance has the same truth-value no matter which is selected.
Several solutions to the problem of the many have been proposed.  For ex-
ample, one could exploit the technique of supervaluations developed by van
Fraassen (1966) for the semantics of free logic. (See  Fine 1975 for an applica-
Limited Intentionism is a controversial claim.  In saying that
demonstrative reference is fixed by speaker intentions, it
opposes contextualism, which holds that demonstrative refer-
ence is fixed by publicly accessible cues embedded in the
conversational context rather than by speaker intentions.
12
Unlike traditional intentionism, Limited Intentionism speci-
fies the kind of intention that fixes reference: the perceptu-
ally anchored kind.  Limited Intentionism thus gives a crite-
rion that says which intention fixes reference when referen-
tial intentions conflict, as they do in Reimer's and Wettstein's
cases.
Limited Intentionism is designed to be a view about de-
monstrative reference-fixing for Basic Cases, as these were
defined in Section 1.  We can see that the Basic Cases include
cases like Reimer's and Wettstein's.  A Basic Case, recall, is a
use of a demonstrative D by a speaker S that refers to an ob-
ject x under the following three conditions:
(a) S perceives x;
(b) S intends to refer to x by using D;
(c) The intention described in (b) is anchored by
S's perception of x.
13
                                                                                                                    
tion of supervaluationist semantics to the problem of vagueness.)  In a super-
valuationist semantics, truth is replaced by super-truth, where an utterance is su-
per-true iff it is true under all admissable ways of making the unmade semantic
(or pragmatic) decision; it is super-false if it is false under all these ways; and
super-truth rather than truth simpliciter is the goal of the utterance.  For other
proposed solutions to the problem of the many, see Lewis 1993.
12Defenses of contextualism include Biro 1982, Gauker 1994, McGinn
1981, and Wettstein 1984.  Reimer (1992) defends a mixed view.
13One referee worried that the definitions of "Basic Case" and "Limited In-
tentionism" made LI trivial.  "Any case to which LI does not apply," wrote the
referee, elaborating the worry, "does not count as a Basic Case."  I take the
worry to be this: it ought to be conceptually possible for a detractor from LI to
deny that LI "applies" to a given Basic Case of demonstrative reference; but the9
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Because Reimer's and Wettstein's speakers perceive what
their uses of demonstratives refer to, they both meet condi-
tion (a).  And both speakers intend to refer to x by their uses
of a demonstrative, so both meet condition (b) as well.
Moreover, the referential intentions these speakers have are
perceptually anchored.  In each case, the speaker's percep-
tion of x is not incidental to his or her intention to refer to x:
Reimer's speaker does not just happen to be touching one of
the sets of keys to which she intends to refer; rather, it is by
holding the keys that she differentiates that set of keys from
other things.  Similarly, the fact that Wettstein's speaker sees
the man raking leaves is not incidental to his intention to re-
fer to that man; rather, it is by seeing that man that the
speaker singles out one of the men as the man to whom he
intends to refer.  So both speakers meet condition (c) as well.
It is clear that Limited Intentionism makes the right pre-
diction in Wettstein's case about which referential intention
fixes reference.  It predicts that the speaker's use of 'that' will
refer to the man raking leaves, as that is the only thing about
which the speaker has formed a perceptually anchored ref-
erential intention.
In Reimer's case, the prediction made by Limited Inten-
tionism may seem less clear.  Reimer's speaker has a tactu-
                                                                                                                    
definitions in question rule this out.  Given the definition of Basic Case and the
statement of LI, LI is trivially true.
LI is a biconditional.  I said earlier (in note 3, above) that I would ignore the
difference between "iff" and "because".  To be perfectly explicit, LI has the
form: p iff and because q.  Does the definition of "Basic Case" allow detractors
from LI to grant that there is such a thing?  Yes.  This definition has the form of
an existentially quantified conjunction: there is an object x such that: the speaker
perceives x; the speaker has a perceptually anchored intention to refer to x; and x
is the referent of the speaker's use of a demonstrative.  As I argue in the text be-
low, Reimer's key-grabbing case is a Basic Case.  But of course Reimer denies
that the key-grabber's use of 'these' refers to what it does because of her percep-
tually anchored intention.  There is no conceptual error here.
ally based intention to refer to the keys she is holding.  But
she also saw her own keys on the table, before she grabbed
the wrong set.  The fact that she saw her own keys suggests
that in addition to the tactually anchored referential inten-
tion, the speaker has a visually anchored referential inten-
tion as well.  And these would be conflicting intentions, each
linked to a different set of keys.  So how can Limited Inten-
tionism rightly predict, in Reimer's case, that the speaker's
use of the demonstrative refers to the keys she is holding
rather than to the keys she saw?
Let us examine these two perceptual links more closely.
At time 1, the speaker sees her keys.  Then, at time 2, she at-
tempts to grab them, and it is in this failed attempt that the
demonstrative utterance occurs.  By time 2, the speaker has
ceased to look where she is grabbing, relying on visual
memory to guide her grasping motion.  Since it is at time 2
that the use of the demonstrative occurs, it is at time 2 that
the speaker has all her referential intentions of the relevant
sort.
14  In particular, it is at time 2 that the speaker has one
referential intention that is anchored by a present perceptual
link that is tactile, and a conflicting referential intention that
is anchored by a past perceptual link, which is visual.  In
general, one can distinguish between a referential intention
anchored to x entirely by current perceptual experience, on
the one hand, and a referential intention anchored to x en-
tirely by perceptual memory, without concurrent perceptual
experience that is also linked to x, on the other.
 To be sure, there could be a referential intention that is
14Don't confuse referential intentions with intentions to utter certain expres-
sions.  Only the former are relevant to the debate over intentionism.  Referential
intentions concern particular uses of expressions.  There is no such a thing as a
referential intention that a speaker has even though she has not uttered anything.
Before she speaks, the speaker may intend to speak, and there may be particular
expressions that she intends to use.  But this is not the kind of referential inten-
tion at issue in the debate over intentionism about demonstrative reference.10
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neither anchored entirely by an ongoing perceptual experi-
ence nor anchored entirely by perceptual memory without
concurrent anchoring experience but rather by a combina-
tion of both.  Suppose you're in the woods, and all of the
sudden you see and hear a short, quick rustling on the
ground just to your left.  A snake has slithered by, and you
happened to be looking in its direction during the split-
second that some parts of it were visible through the uneven
ground-cover of pine needles and leaves.  "Hey, that's a
snake!", you say, and by the time you finish speaking it has
vanished.  In this case, during the time of utterance, your
referential intention changes from being anchored by per-
ceptual experience to being anchored by perceptual memory
without concurrent anchoring perceptual experience.  Rei-
mer's case does not contain any such referential intention.  It
contains a referential intention anchored entirely by visual
memory, on the one hand, and a referential intention an-
chored by current tactile experience, on the other.
The key distinction, then, is between a referential inten-
tion anchored to x by ongoing perceptual experience of x, on
the one hand; and a referential intention anchored to x by
perceptual memory without concurrent perceptual experi-
ence of x, on the other.  This distinction provides the
grounds for Limited Intentionism's prediction in Reimer's
case.  At the time of utterance, Reimer's speaker has no cur-
rent perceptual link to her keys.  A fortiori, she does not
have multiple referential intentions both of which are an-
chored by current perceptual experience.  Limited Inten-
tionism predicts that the referential intention anchored by
current perceptual experience is the one that fixes reference.
To make the statement of Limited Intentionism fully explicit:
LI. If x is perceptually appearing to S then: S's
use of D refers to x iff S has a perceptually
anchored intention to refer to x by her use of
D.
So far, I have used the expression "perceptually anchored
referential intention" to talk about referential intentions that
are anchored by current perceptual experience, and I've ex-
cluded from this category referential intentions that are an-
chored exclusively by perceptual memory.  I will continue to
talk this way in the rest of the discussion.
15
Although Reimer's case does not contain conflicting per-
ceptually anchored referential intentions of the type that fix
reference, such conflicts are clearly possible.  So let us con-
sider how Limited Intentionism can treat those conflicts.
Cases in which there are conflicting perceptually an-
chored referential intentions will have the following struc-
ture.  The speaker simultaneously perceives different objects
and forms multiple referential intentions concerning a single
use of 'that'. Here is an example, similar to one discussed in
another context by Sydney Shoemaker (1994, p. 83):
Multiple Perceptual Links. You are a salesman in
a tie store.  By reaching past an opaque door
into a display case, you put your hand on a
blue silk tie.  At the same time, another sales-
man is reaching through the cabinet and
15There are borderline cases of perception: for instance, if one grabs an ob-
ject while wearing very thick gloves or while one's hand is numb, does one tac-
tually perceive via one's hand the object grabbed?  This is a good candidate for
being a borderline case of tactual perception.  Accordingly, referential intentions
formed on the strength of such perceptual or quasi-perceptual links to objects
will be borderline cases of perceptually anchored intentions, and demonstrative
reference in such cases would be a borderline case of a Basic Case.  Limited In-
tentionism, however, is not committed to the view that such cases will also be
borderline cases of demonstrative reference itself.  For all Limited Intentionism
says, some other sort of reference-securing relation could be at work such cases.11
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touching a red silk tie.  Through the glass top
of the cabinet, you can see the red tie being
held by the other salesman, whose arm looks
like yours.  You mistake his hand for yours and
you believe that you are the one touching the
red tie.  You say to a customer, who was look-
ing in another direction for a red silk tie, "This
one is red."
In this example, you are touching the blue tie while you are
seeing the red tie, and you think that the tie you are seeing is
the same as the tie you are touching.  More exactly, you
think that a single location is occupied by the red silk tie you
are seeing and the silk tie (which is blue) that you are
touching.  There is no single tie that perceptually appears to
you, to which a single referential intention is anchored.
It is controversial what status the use of the demonstra-
tive has in such cases.  There are three options: it refers to
one of the candidate objects but not the other; it fails to refer
altogether; or it refers to both objects.
Of these three options, the first is the weakest.  We
should not be misled by the fact that in our sample case of
multiple perceptual links, only one of the ties is gestured at.
For not only is the speaker confused (which suggests that his
intentions are not fit to fix reference to one tie rather than
another) but it would be easy to construct a case in which
the speaker gestures at both ties yet takes himself to be ges-
turing only at one (which suggests that these too, like the
speaker's intentions, are not fit to determine reference to one
tie rather than the other).
16  The live options, then, are that
there is reference failure or that the speaker somehow refers
to both ties.
On the side of the reference-failure option, there is the
16For comparable discussion, see Devitt 1981, ch. 5, sec. 4.
intuition that the speaker is too confused to have succeeded
in referring to anything.  Evans defends this option in his
1982, Chapter 5.
On the side of the option that the speaker refers to both
ties, there is the intuition—call it the Truth Intuition—that he
has said something true (namely, that the tie he is seeing is
red).  More generally, there is the point that confused speak-
ers can have multiple links to multiple objects, where each
link suffices for reference-fixing.  Consider an analogous
case involving ordinary proper names.  You are talking to
someone who asks you whether Billie is still in town.  He
has in mind his cousin Billie, who you mistakenly think is
the same person as the Billie you met yesterday.  You say, "I
don't know whether Billie is still in town."  You seem to say
something meaningful.  If you say something meaningful,
then your use of 'Billie' must have a referent.  Whatever the-
ory of reference-fixing for names we select, it seems possible
to spell out the details of the case in such a way that you
have two links of the same sort, one to each of the two Bil-
lies.
How could the use of 'that' refer to both ties?  It clearly
can't be that the condition of both ties is relevant to a single
set of truth-conditions.  Whatever the speaker is saying, it is
not that some sort of conglomerate entity consisting of both
ties is red.  Rather, the use of 'that', if it referred to both ties,
would have multiple reference, and the utterance in which the
use of the demonstrative occured—here, an utterance of 'this
is red'—would have two sets of truth conditions.
17  If it has
17What I have called "multiple reference" is more typically (but I think less
aptly) called "partial reference".  This notion is discussed in Field 1973 and De-
vitt 1981, pp. 138ff.  Note the difference between multiple reference and super-
valuation.  Supervaluation is an account of how an utterance can have some va-
riety of truth-value when neither semantics nor pragmatics decides which of a
range of objects is the referent of the problematic expression.  In particular, if an
utterance made while standing in multiple perceptual links is super-true, then it12
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two sets of truth-conditions, then there must be two links to
two referents, and each by itself must be sufficient to fix ref-
erence.
Limited Intentionism can do justice either to the Truth
Intuition (that our salesman has said something true) or to
the Evansian intuition that the utterance lacks truth-value
altogether.  Given that Limited Intentionism is meant to be
an illuminating account of reference-fixing, everything es-
sential to the view is captured by both the original version:
LI. If x is perceptually appearing to S then: S's
use of D refers to x iff S has a perceptually
anchored intention to refer to x by her use of
D
and by the Evansian version, which rules that in cases of
multiple perceptual links to a single use of a demonstrative,
there is reference failure:
LI'.   If  x is perceptually appearing to S then: S's
use of D refers to x iff there is a unique x such
                                                                                                                    
is true no matter which perceptual link is taken to lead to the referent.  This is
clearly not the case in the example: the utterance of 'This is red' is true when the
visual link is taken to be the link to the referent; but false when the tactile link is
taken to do this job.  Thus, according to a supervaluationst definition of truth,
the utterance would lack a truth-value instead of possessing two, as on the par-
tial reference account.
In the example given, the results delivered by a supervaluationist account
accord with the views of some philosophers on multiple information links.  For
instance, according to Evans (1982), if a purported case of demonstrative refer-
ence involves multiple information links, what results is reference failure, hence
lack of truth-value.  But this coincidence of predictions does not survive if we
change the example so that both perceptual links connect the speaker to some-
thing red.  In that case, the utterance will count as super-true, whereas by
Evans's lights, the use of the demonstrative will fail to refer.
that S has a perceptually anchored intention
to refer to it by her use of D.
Suppose first that LI' is true.  Then, in the case of Multiple
Perceptual Links, the use of the demonstrative fails to refer,
and so no question of reference-fixing arises at all.  Hence LI'
does not offer a false account of reference fixing for these
cases.
Now suppose LI is true.  The speaker's perceptual links
are links to two different objects.  Each link allows the
speaker to form separate referential intentions, and these
referential intentions are the kind that, according to LI, fix
reference.  LI says nothing about whether the utterance itself
has two sets of truth-conditions.  But given that there is no
single set of truth conditions that depends on the condition
of both ties, this seems to be the only option, if there are two
referential intentions, each of which is the right kind to fix
reference.  When multiple perceptually anchored intentions
are intentions to refer by a single use of a demonstrative,
then LI predicts that there will be multiple reference, and the
utterance will have two separate sets of truth-conditions.
Since both LI and LI' capture what is essential to Limited
Intentionism—namely the role of perception in demonstra-
tive reference—Limited Intentionism can do justice to either
the view that there is reference failure or to the Truth Intui-
tion.  It does not matter for the plausibility of Limited Inten-
tionism how the dispute between them is settled.
I have argued that in Basic Cases, intentionism is true:
the reference of perceptual uses of demonstratives is fixed by
a perceptually anchored referential intention.  This view
makes the right predictions in the problem cases. But what
justifies having a theory of demonstrative reference-fixing
that is limited to these perceptual uses?  In the next section, I
answer this question.13
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5. Why not to expect a uniform account
of demonstrative reference-fixing
According to Limited Intentionism, there is a very close re-
lation between perceptual states, on the one hand, and the
reference-fixing story for certain uses of demonstratives, on
the other.  Some philosophers object to the idea that there is
any close relation between perception and demonstrative
reference-fixing because they think that an account of refer-
ence-fixing for demonstrative expressions has to cover a
very wide class of uses.  For example, Colin McGinn says:
Perception, it is true, is a generally good guide to deictic
reference, because objects are apt to be in the places they
seem to be and because we typically know the disposi-
tions of objects around us by way of perception; but as
soon as these generally applicable conditions break
down, . . . it becomes clear that what makes for reference
is some other mechanism—perception starts to look in-
cidental. [1981, p. 163]
According to McGinn, the fact that we can demonstrate
things that are not perceptually present counts against the
idea that a correct reference-fixing account for uses of de-
monstratives in other cases invokes perception.
18
 We find a similar line of thought in  Reimer's discussion
of an example familiar from Kaplan, in which the speaker
has no perceptual link to the picture at which she points
(Reimer 1991, pp. 191-92).  In the example, someone is
pointing at a picture of Spiro Agnew, which is hanging on a
wall behind him, where there used to be a picture of Rudolf
18McGinn gives several examples of demonstrative reference to things un-
perceived by the speaker; one example is of an assembly line inspector whose
job it is to say, of each car he deems roadworthy, "This car is roadworthy."
Usually he looks at the car as it goes by, but on occasion he utters this sentence
while pointing at the car but not looking at it or perceiving it in any other way
(1981, pp. 161-62).
Carnap.  The speaker, who cannot see the picture, says, "This
is the most important philosopher of the twentieth century,"
intending to refer to the picture of Carnap.
19  This case is
meant to elicit the intuition that what is said by the utterance
is false, because "this" refers to the picture gestured toward
(Agnew), rather than to the picture toward which the
speaker intended to gesture (Carnap).
Because Reimer thinks there is a single phenomenon of
demonstrative reference that does not vary according to
whether the speaker is perceptually anchored to the referent,
she takes it that the Carnap/Agnew case is relevant to
evaluating any proposal about demonstrative reference-
fixing.
20  Like McGinn, Reimer expects a uniform account of
reference-fixing for all uses of demonstratives.
As it happens, many philosophers deny that the same
factors secure reference of all demonstrative expressions, if
'that'-phrases (such as 'these keys') are included with bare
demonstratives.  One claim about 'that'-phrases, compatible
with a variety of semantic theories that take 'that'-phrases to
be referring expressions, is that a use of 'that F' refers to an
object o only if o is F.
21  In contrast, bare demonstratives do
19Kaplan describes this case in his 1978, p. 30.
20Reimer says: "it is often just such 'atypical' cases which enable us to adju-
dicate between competing views which account equally well for all the 'typical'
cases.  Kaplan's [intentionist] view may fare as well with such 'typical' cases as
some competing view which regards the demonstration as being crucial to the
determination of the demonstratum.  And yet Kaplan's view may (as we've just
seen) give a much poorer showing than the competing view when it comes to
dealing with certain 'atypical' cases.  Other things being equal, the logical con-
clusion to draw is that the competing theory is the better of the two" (1991, p.
19).
21This claim is defended in Davies 1982, Borg 2000, Braun 1994, Recanati
1993, and Reimer 1998. Recently some philosophers have argued against the
view that complex demonstratives are referring expressions at all: e.g., King
(1999 and 2000, ch. 1); and Lepore and Ludwig (2000).  (Lepore and Ludwig
take their view that complex demonstratives are quantificational to be compati-14
Susanna Siegel Perception in Demonstrative Reference
not have any such constraint on what uses of them can refer
to.  Even among demonstrative expressions, then, uniform-
ity in reference-fixing is not expected.
In any case, reference-fixing for other referring expres-
sions is not a uniform matter.  Consider ordinary proper
names.  Is reference for all names secured by the same type
of relation?  No.  Once Kripke discovered that ordinary
proper names designate rigidly,
22  some philosophers, in-
cluding Kripke, argued for something more controversial:
that the reference of a proper name on an occasion of use is
often fixed by some sort of causal chain of communication,
linking a name to its bearer.
23  But even Kripke allows that
there are some names whose reference is entirely fixed by a
description—even after the name has been introduced.  For
example, this occurs when the London police use the name
'Jack the Ripper' to refer to the man, whoever he is, who
committed all or most of a certain group of murders.
24  This
                                                                                                                    
ble with a treatment of uses of bare demonstratives—'this', 'that' and their plu-
rals—as referring.)  Limited Intentionism takes no stand on the semantics or
metasemantics of complex demonstratives.  It is a view exclusively about uses
of bare demonstratives.
22For discussion of Kripke's argument and its consequences, see section 4 of
Stanley 1997.
23See Devitt 1981; Evans 1973; and Kripke 1980, pp. 94ff, where Kripke
says (after noting that he does not purport to give necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a name to refer), "it's in virtue of our connection with other speakers
in the community, going back to the referent itself, that we refer to a certain
man."  One way that a chain of communication could "go  back to the referent
itself" would be to go back to the original employment of the name, which had
its reference fixed by description.  Even then, although the reference of a name
may initially be fixed by a description, it is not because speakers know which
thing satisfies the description that the name refers to what it refers to.
24Kripke 1980, p. 79; cf. p. 94.  Names like 'Jack the Ripper' function as
what Evans calls "descriptive names" (1979; 1982, ch. 2, sec. 3).  Kripke also
gives an example of a name whose reference is initially fixed by a description:
e.g., 'Neptune' was hypothesized to be the planet that causes certain perturba-
is not just a matter of introducing the name's referent.  Since
reference of descriptive names is determined differently
from the way the reference of typical proper names is de-
termined,
25 there is no uniform account of reference-fixing
for ordinary proper names.  Thus there is no perfectly gen-
eral reason to think that we should take such an attitude to-
ward each class of singular terms, a fortiori toward demon-
strative expressions.
26
Furthermore, intentionists have special reason to reject
McGinn and Reimer's assumption that demonstrative refer-
                                                                                                                    
tions in the orbits of certain other planets (1980, p. 79, n. 33).  According to
Kripke's picture of how names refer, however, the description only fixed the ref-
erence initially; later, the name referred to Neptune because of a causal chain of
communication.
25Even if you don't accept Kripke's causal story about how the reference of
proper names is typically determined, it will still be true that descriptive names
have their reference fixed differently from ordinary proper names.  For on the
most plausible developed alternative to Kripke's theory, it is not a single de-
scription which fixes the reference of ordinary proper names but a cluster of
criteria of identification.  Moreover, not all of the criteria need be descriptive.
Besides descriptive criteria, the cluster could include deference to the ability of
others to recognize the bearer of the name.  See Dummett 1973, ch.  5, appendix.
26One might suggest an appeal to Kaplan's notion of character to defend the
Uniformity Assumption, on the grounds that if two token expressions have the
same character, then whatever determines the reference of the first expression
must also determine the reference of the second.  This suggestion, however,
would be mistaken.  The character of the deictic 'that' is not sensitive to the dif-
ferent ways in which context can determine content (which for Kaplan is itself a
function from worlds to extensions) let alone reference.  The character of an ex-
pression helps us state what semantic value an expression has on an occasion of
use.  But it does not tell us what the basis is for determining that semantic value.
(In Kaplan's terms, the notion of character belongs to semantics rather than to
metasemantics: see his 1989, p. 573).  The basis for determining the semantic
value of a deictic occurrence of 'that' in a context A could, for all its character
tells us, differ from the basis for determining the semantic value of such an oc-
currence in context B.  So this suggestion will not help the fan of the Uniformity
Assumption.15
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ence-fixing will be uniform.  Uniform intentionism faces dif-
ficulties that can be solved only by denying the assumption
of uniformity.  We can see this by examining two proposed
accounts of uniform intentionism, both suggested (though
neither endorsed) in remarks by Kent Bach to the effect that
specifically referential intentions are communicative inten-
tions.
27
The following remarks of Bach's suggest that the specifi-
cally referential intention—that is, the one that determines
what referent the use of the demonstrative will have—is a
part of an intention to communicate with one's addressee:
The relevant intention here, the specifically referential
one, is part of a communicative intention. . . . As part of
that intention, a referential intention isn't just any inten-
tion to refer to something one has in mind, but is the in-
tention that one's audience identify, and take themselves
to be intended to identify, a certain item as the referent
by means of thinking of it in a certain identifiable way.
[1992, 143]
Consider the view that the specifically referential intentions
have as their content instances of INT-1:
28
INT-1. that my use of D refer to x and that my
addressees identify x  in way W as the
27My concern is not with Bach's own view but with the prima facie plausi-
ble positions that his remarks suggest.  The two versions of uniform intention-
ism I consider in this section would not be acceptable to Bach, who does not
agree with two claims that each proposal presupposes: (1) that uses of demon-
stratives refer; (2) that such uses have a semantic reference. See his 1987, pp. 5-
6 and ch. 9.
28As I am using the phrase, "specifically referential intention" means the
same as "intention that fixes reference."  This is not, however, how Bach uses
this phrase.
referent of my use of D
29
where the intention with instances of INT-1 as its content is
de re with respect to x.
30  When joined with the assumption of
uniformity in demonstrative reference, the view that refer-
ential intentions have content INT-1 has an implausible con-
sequence.  Consider a use of 'that ball' in an utterance of
'That ball is dirty', made by a (blindfolded) speaker who
points at random and only accidentally ends up pointing at a
ball.  Even if the speaker intends that his addressees identify
the referent (if there is one) of his use of 'that ball' by his
gesture of pointing, he is not in a position to intend that his
addressees identify a particular as the referent of that use.
The proponent of the view that reference-fixing intentions
have as their content instances of INT-1 would have to deny
that reference is possible in this case: she would have to
claim, that is, that no use of demonstratives that is inappro-
priate in this way can succeed in referring.  And that seems
hard to swallow.  One can avoid this consequence and still
maintain that intentions with content of the form INT-1 fix
reference only if one denies that demonstrative reference-
fixing is uniform and sets aside cases such as the one de-
scribed for special treatment.
29Given Bach's own views about what refers, he would deny that INT-1 was
the content of any referential intention.  Closer to Bach's view would be that
INT-1' is sometimes the content of referential intentions:
INT-1'. that I refer to x by the use of D and that my addressees identify
x in way W as the thing I refer to by that use.
30I am assuming that contents of intentions are propositions, and that a
proposition expressed by a sentence of the form a is F is de re with respect to an
object o just in case its truth or falsity with respect to world w depends on and
only on whether F applies to o in w.  (Bold italics indicate corner-quotes).  It
does not matter for our purposes what the truth-value of the proposition ex-
pressed by an instance of a is F is, with respect to worlds in which o (the refer-
ent of a) does not exist.16
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Furthermore, what made Reimer and Wettstein's cases
challenging for traditional intentionism was precisely that
the speaker conflated two things: in Reimer's case, the
speaker's own keys and the keys she was holding; in
Wettstein's case, Jones and the man raking leaves.  Intentions
that have instances of INT-1 as their contents do not distin-
guish between the intention that one's use of D refer to Jones
and one's addressee's identify Jones in way W, on the one
hand; and the intention that one's use of D refer to the man
raking leaves and one's addressees identify the man raking
leaves in way W.  Such contents leave underdefined what it
is to have x in mind.  As a result, the view that they fix refer-
ence does not make a clear prediction as to what uses of de-
monstratives refer to in these cases of conflation.
This consequence seems to be avoided by replacing INT-
1 with a schema for an intention that is not de re with respect
to an intended referent.  Other remarks of Bach's suggest a
proposal along these lines.  In discussing a case (of Reimer's)
in which you intend to point at Fido but instead point at
Spot and say "that dog is Fido," Bach claims that you, the
speaker, have an intention "to refer to the dog that you are
demonstrating" (p. 143).  With respect to it, "you say what
you intend to say in uttering 'That dog is Fido,' namely, that
the dog you are pointing at is Fido."
Now, Bach stresses that pointing is not always necessary:
If you utter 'that dog' and the dog you intend to be refer-
ring to is the only one around or is maximally salient in
some way, you won't have to do anything more to en-
able your audience to identify it.  Otherwise, you will
need to point at it.  In so doing, you will be intending to
refer to the dog you are pointing at.  But being pointed
at is just one way of being salient, and like other ways, is
not semantically significant.  [1992, p. 145]
These remarks suggest the view that specifically referential
intentions have as their contents instances of INT-2:
INT-2. that my use of D refer to the thing that is
salient in way W, and that my addressees
take my use of D to refer to the thing that
is salient in way W.
31
Some instances of INT-2 will have the content "that my use
of D refer to the thing I am pointing at"; others will have the
content "that my use of D refer to the conversationally sali-
ent F".  Unlike the intentions with content INT-1, these in-
tentions are only de re with respect to the way of thinking of
an item.  They are not de re with respect to any item which is
to be thought of in way W.
Though INT-2 may seem to avoid the trouble with INT-1,
it runs into a similar kind of trouble.  Suppose that Jones is
conversationally salient and two men raking leaves are visu-
ally salient.  We would expect the speaker who conflates
Jones with one of the men raking leaves to believe that there
is a unique person who is both conversationally and visually
salient.  Being salient in both these ways would be way W in
this case.  The lesson here is that the notion of public salience
is as underdefined as the notion of having something in
mind.  In order even to evaluate the proposal that the refer-
ence-fixing intentions have content INT-2, we have to make
the ways of being salient more specific.  Unless we specify
this notion, the proposal will not make a clear prediction as
to what the reference of the use of D is in the problem cases.
Neither of the Bach-inspired intentionist proposals stays
true to the assumption of uniformity.  Limited Intentionism
is preferable, since it provides a principle with which to dis-
tinguish the reference-fixing referential intentions from the
others.
31For the same reasons that  Bach would modify INT-1 along the lines of
INT-1' (see note 29, above), he would modify INT-2 in the same way.17
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6. An Apparent Counterexample to Limited Intentionism
In this section, I consider and reply to an apparent counter-
example to Limited Intentionism.
Consider the following scenario:
The Wayward Gesture.  A speaker, focusing his
visual attention on a ball that has bounced into
the street, wants to tell his addressee to go pick
it up.  He points and says, "Go pick up that
ball."  But this speaker has extremely bad mo-
tor coordination, so that wherever he intends
to point, he ends up pointing 90 degrees to the
right.  He does not know this about himself,
however.  As it happens, there is a ball in the
direction in which he unwittingly points that is
resting in a mud puddle.
The case of the wayward gesture poses a prima facie prob-
lem for Limited Intentionism.
32  Going by the cues in the
32A similar objection would be a case of a "wayward predicate".  Consider a
speaker who misspeaks and says "That rabbit is fast" when she means to say
"That squirrel is fast."  She is seeing both a squirrel and a rabbit, and wishes to
talk about the squirrel.  If Limited Intentionism applies to uses of demonstrative
phrases such as 'that rabbit', and if the use of that phrase in this case refers to the
rabbit, then it would seem to prevent the predicate 'rabbit' from having any role
in fixing the reference of uses of demonstrative phrases.  Many philosophers
find this implausible (e.g.,  Braun 1994, sec. 10).
I need not deny the intuition that in such a case, the semantic reference of
the use of 'that rabbit' is the rabbit and not the squirrel.  Even if this intuition is
true, it does not threaten a Limited Intentionist treatment of demonstrative
phrases of the form that F.  The reason is that this is not a Basic Case of a use of
a demonstrative.  For a use of a demonstrative expression D to be a Basic Case,
where the use of D refers to x, the speaker must have an intention to refer to x by
the use of D.  (This is condition [b] of the definition of "Basic Case".)  The
speaker in this case does not have any intention (a fortiori, any perceptually an-
chored one) to refer to the squirrel by the use of 'that rabbit'.  In so far as the
context alone, many addressees would assume that the
speaker intended to refer to the ball in the mud puddle,
rather than to the ball in the street.  Because this assumption
would be a reasonable one, says the critic of Limited Inten-
tionism, the speaker's use of the demonstrative has as its se-
mantic reference the ball in the mud puddle, though it has as
its speaker reference the ball in the street.
33  While Limited
Intentionism makes the right prediction about speaker refer-
ence in this case, its prediction about semantic reference,
says the critic, is false.
The critic has the primitive intuition that the use of 'that
ball' refers to the ball in the mud puddle.  Similar cases,
however, may elicit different intuitions. Suppose a lecturer
says "Look at this," using a laser pointer to indicate the spot
on the screen where she wants her addressees to focus.  Un-
beknownst to her, however, glare from the sun is obscuring
the laser point so that none of the addressees can see it.  In-
stead, the glare makes it look to them as if the pointer is di-
rected at a different place on the screen.
This case seems similar to the case of the Wayward Ges-
ture: the addressees in both cases have justified but false be-
liefs about what the speaker intends to refer to.  Suppose,
                                                                                                                    
speaker misspeaks, she does not have any referential intention with respect to
the phrase 'that rabbit' at all.  The fact that the use of the predicate is uninten-
tional disqualifies the use of the demonstrative from being a Basic Case.  (By
contrast, an unintentional gesture does not disqualify the use of the demonstra-
tive it accompanies from being a Basic Case.)
In a willful misuse of 'that rabbit' to refer to a squirrel, the speaker would
intend that her use of that phrase refer to the squirrel.  This, however, would be a
non-standard, possibly degenerate case of communication.  Whether there is
such a thing as semantic reference in such cases, and if so, how it should be
treated by semantic and metasemantic theories, are matters that deserve separate
discussion.
33For more on the distinction between speaker reference and semantic refer-
ence, see Kripke 1979.18
Susanna Siegel Perception in Demonstrative Reference
however, that we add to the laser-pointer case addressees
who are sitting in a different part of the room and who can
see the spot indicated by the laser-pointer.  Some addressees
are led to the justified false belief about what the speaker
intends to talk about; others are not.  The intuition that
judgments of addressees in the former epistemic situation
still trump the intentions of the speaker in determining de-
monstrative reference now seems much less firm.  So intui-
tions about the strength of addressees' judgments about de-
monstrative reference vary across similar cases.
The instability of intuitions raises a methodological point.
If primitive intuitions vary across similar cases, this dimin-
ishes the weight that we should give them on their own in
assessing what uses of demonstratives refer to.  Variation in
primitive intuitions forces us to revert to theoretical reasons
that could corroborate the intuitions.
The theory of semantic reference that best corroborates
the critic's intuition in the Wayward Gesture case is the fol-
lowing: the semantic reference of a use of an expression is
what a normal, rational addressee would take the use of the
demonstrative to (semantically) refer to, without relying on
background knowledge about the speaker, including knowl-
edge of his idiosyncrasies, beliefs, intentions, deficits, confu-
sions, etc.
How does this theory of semantic demonstrative refer-
ence corroborate the critics intuition in the case of the Way-
ward Gesture?  Well, if, contra that intuition, the semantic
reference of 'that ball' were the ball in the street, then to
know what semantic reference the speaker's use of 'that ball'
has, one would have to know special facts about the speaker.
In particular, one would have to know that his gesture of
pointing does not have its conventional meaning.  But the
addressees' judgments that guide semantic demonstrative
reference, according to the theory, do not rely on any special
knowledge of this sort.
But any theory of semantic reference that relies on the
judgment that reasonable addressees would make regarding
demonstrative reference will run into sand, because such
judgments can vary with the background beliefs of the ad-
dressee.
34  Consider once again Kaplan's case in which a
speaker points behind him and says, "That is a picture of the
best philosopher of the twentieth century."  He thinks he is
pointing at a picture of Rudolf Carnap, but in fact he is
pointing at a picture of Spiro Agnew.  What would a "nor-
mal" addressee take the use of 'that' to refer to?  Well, that
would depend on how much the addressee knew about the
topic of the utterance.  If the addressee knew that Spiro Ag-
new was not a philosopher at all, then he might, out of char-
ity, take the speaker to be referring to some other picture just
out of the addressee's sight but in the vicinity of the point-
ing.  A reasonable addressee equally disposed to charity but
lacking the relevant background knowledge would not draw
this conclusion.  Similarly, what a particular reasonable ad-
dressee takes a use of a demonstrative to refer to can depend
on what parts of the scene are visible, as we've seen from the
case of the laser pointer.
35  In general, what a particular ad-
34A similar problem will face the slightly more complicated proposal that a
use of a demonstrative semantically refers to what standard, rational addressees
would take the speaker to be intending to refer to by her use of that demonstra-
tive.
35In discussing the laser pointer case, I've assumed that the objects of per-
ception are public: that whenever there is a Basic Case of demonstrative refer-
ence, there is also something publicly perceivable to which the speaker is per-
ceptually anchored.  This is a substantive assumption in the philosophy of per-
ception, though it is widely held.  (Opponents of it include some sense-datum
theorists, e.g., Price [1932], Robinson [1994], and Jackson [1977]; and Meinong
[1904].)  If a speaker could be perceptually anchored to a private object of hal-
lucination (supposing there were such objects), then there could be Basic Cases19
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dressee takes a use of a demonstrative to refer to could de-
pend on that addressee's beliefs (either beliefs about the
topic or beliefs based on perception at the time of utterance).
To be sure, speakers in cases like the Wayward Gesture
and the laser pointer should consider themselves to have
misled their addressees.  So long as no addressee is in a po-
sition to see the signal of the laser pointer, or more generally
to perceive any of the cues the speaker uses to indicate
which thing she is talking about, the utterance is inappropri-
ate—just as it would be inappropriate for me to point to a set
of keys you were asking about and say "These are them!" if,
unbeknownst to me, you were blindfolded.  Such gestures
are inappropriate in that they obstruct the exchange of in-
formation between speaker and addressee.
But theories go too far if they make semantic demonstra-
tive reference depend on what addressees take to be the ref-
erent.  These theories misconstrue the importance of cues
that indicate what the speaker intends to talk about.  They
will always face the same sort of objection: that semantic ref-
erence does not depend on the perspective of the addressee,
whether it be a perceptual perspective or a set of back-
ground beliefs.
36  In contrast, the judgments that normal, ra-
tional addressees would make, even while disregarding any
special knowledge about the speaker that they may have,
                                                                                                                    
in which the speaker, and only the speaker, could perceive the intended referent.
In such communicatively degenerate cases, it might be more plausible that se-
mantic reference is something other than the intended reference.  That there are
such private objects of perception, however, is doubtful.  For standard meta-
physical worries about how there could be such objects, see Armstrong 1968,
ch. 10, sec. 4, and Chisholm 1941.)
36As before, the same objection applies to the slightly more complicated
proposal that a use of a demonstrative semantically refers to what standard, ra-
tional addressees would take the speaker to be intending to refer to by her use of
that demonstrative.
will vary from addressee to addressee.  There is no such
thing as the judgment of a normal, rational addressee to
which such theories can appeal.  So not only is the primitive
intuition about the Wayward Gesture case unstable; in addi-
tion, the theories of semantic reference corroborating it are
too implausible to threaten Limited Intentionism.
The central question about demonstrative utterances is
how they can represent the world at all.  It is not at all obvi-
ous how there can even be demonstrative reference. What
could anchor a use of a word to a thing?  An account of de-
monstrative reference would be an answer to this question.
Limited Intentionism, though not a complete explanation, is
a beginning.  Like standard versions of intentionism, it
pushes back a question about linguistic reference to a ques-
tion about how mental states—in particular, referential in-
tentions—can be directed toward objects.  Unlike standard
versions of intentionism, however, it says that the latter is a
question about how perception anchors referential intentions
to their objects.  The rest of the story about demonstrative
reference-fixing in Basic Cases awaits a satisfactory account
of perceptual anchoring.
37
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